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2011年8月27日土曜日

Don't Forget -- We Advised Japan on Policy - TheStreet.com

This column by Roger Arnold originally appeared on RealMoney on Aug. 16. For a free trial to RealMoney, follow this link.

NEW YORK (RealMoney) -- Since 2000, the U.S. has been undergoing a version of Japan's experiences from 1990 to the current day. Economic activity and equity and bond market performance, as well as monetary and fiscal policy actions, are very similar. And the U.S. is clearly still on that path.

This is not accidental or coincidental. It is the result of repeating the same failed policy responses. Japan is in this situation because of the monetary and fiscal policy decisions it made after being advised by U.S. policymakers.

During the latter half of the 1990s, Robert Rubin was the Treasury secretary, and Alan Greenspan was the chairman of the Federal Reserve. They were the primary advisers to their counterparts in Japan, and they advised the Japanese to make the decisions they did on both monetary and fiscal policy.

The advice from the U.S. was based on the long-held belief that deflation was impossible because it could be counteracted with monetary and fiscal stimulus -- printing and spending. This is what the Japanese did. And it didn't work. The conventional rationale for its failure has become not that the prescription was wrong but that the application of it by the Japanese was inadequate.

In other words, the Japanese economy continued to deflate, and is still doing so 17 years later, because the Japanese did not print and spend fast enough or large enough. If they had done so, the policy prescription would have worked to offset deflation and stimulate inflation.

This has been a convenient way to explain why the policies failed in Japan. But it was also perceived to be necessary. I will address this momentarily.

If we simply blame the Japanese policy makers for improperly applying fiscal and monetary stimulus and thwarting it with counterproductive tax policies, the status quo remains unchanged.

Academics did not have to review Keynesian fiscal policy prescriptions or Friedmanite monetary assumptions. Nobody in the public or private sector had to question the concept of the impossibility of deflation. And as a result, the capital markets could pretend that the emergency prescriptions of print-and-spend, if they were ever needed again, could still correct any imbalance that occurred.

To believe in this remedy, you would have to believe that no other policy prescriptions were available. Since the early 1960s, the corrective fiscal and monetary response to a financial crisis or nascent deflation was to print-and-spend and to repeat until the policy was successful or the country was broke.

Politicians, academics and bankers began to believe that if they admitted that there was a problem with the financial emergency response system, and that there was no safety net underneath the capital markets and that wealth could be destroyed, the fear would become self-validating, and investors would move away from risk.

Which brings me to current events in the U.S.

Moral hazard mandated that if the capital markets were to function under the premise that there was a safety net underneath the markets that could correct a market contraction, offset deflation and prevent real loss of wealth, then market participants would eventually push the markets to the point where corrective measures would be required.

And that is indeed what happened. This was the underlying driver of the subprime crisis and the other debacles that led to the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

And just as the policy prescriptions failed in Japan, they've been failing in the U.S. The difference is that the Japanese had no other countries' experiences to look back on and therefore had very little reason to believe those policies wouldn't work there. The U.S., however, does have the Japanese experience to look back on. And that means that the potential for crisis of confidence among the investor class in the U.S. is far greater than it ever was in Japan.

It also means that it is less likely that the U.S. markets and economy will continue to follow the pattern of the past 10 years -- a path that mirrors the one Japan took 10 years earlier. At some point investors will conclude that the Japanese trajectory is unavoidable as policy responses are unworkable; a crisis of confidence.

The seminal question for investors to consider is, are policy makers attempting to prevent this from occurring, or are they preparing to respond to the aftermath?

-- Written by Roger Arnold

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2011年8月25日木曜日

Futures Weak on Downgrade to Japan's Credit Rating - TheStreet.com

NEW YORK (TheStreet) -- U.S. stock futures were pointing to a weaker open Wednesday, stepping back after the previous session's rally as investors digested a downgrade to Japan's credit rating.

Futures for the Dow Jones Industrial Average were down by 94 points, or 109 points below fair value at 11,047. Futures for the S&P 500 were lower by 10 points, or 12 points below fair value, at 1149, and Nasdaq futures were off by 17 points, or 22 points below fair value.

Stocks surged Tuesday as better-than-expected global manufacturing data and speculation that the Fed may consider additional stimulus made investors more willing to take on risk.

Moody's Investors Service lowered the credit rating on Japan by one notch to Aa3 from Aa2 with a stable outlook. The ratings agency cited "large budget deficits and the build-up in Japanese government debt since the 2009 global recession."

A closely watched German business optimism index fell by more than economists expected in August. The index dropped to 108.7 from 112.9 in July. The market had only anticipated a dip to 111.

The FTSE in London was shedding 0.05% while the DAX in Frankfurt was adding 0.6%. Hong Kong's Hang Seng fell 2.1% and Japan's Nikkei lost 1%.

Economists are anticipating a 1.9% increase in July durable goods orders when the U.S. Census Bureau releases its report at 8:30 a.m. EDT. July's growth compares with a decline of 2.1% in June. Excluding transportation, orders are slated to dip 0.5% in July after ticking 0.1% higher in June, according to Briefing.com.

The Federal Housing Finance Agency will issue its housing price index for June at 10 a.m. In May, the index rose 0.4%.

Mining company BHP Billiton(BHP) reported an increase in annual profit of nearly 86% on record production, robust demand and higher prices on iron ore and copper, but warned that it is challenged by "tight labor and raw material markets." The stock was losing 1.3% to $79.85 ahead of Wednesday's opening bell.

Luxury homebuilder Toll Brothers(TOL) said earnings rose to $42.1 million, or 25 cents a share, which included a tax benefit of $38.2 million. Revenue slipped 13% to $394.3 million, missing estimates for sales of $403.6 million. The company also said it is too soon to assess how recent financial volatility has impacted housing markets.

At 10:30 a.m., the Energy Information Administration will give its weekly read on crude oil inventories. Analysts are projecting an increase of 2 million barrels in the week ended Aug. 19, according to a Platts survey.

Late Tuesday, the American Petroleum Institute said crude supplies lost 3.34 million barrels last week.

The October crude oil contract was losing 24 cents to trade at $85.20 a barrel. Elsewhere in commodity markets, gold for December delivery was shedding $11.90 to trade at $1,849.40 an ounce.

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The benchmark 10-year Treasury was rising 7/32, diluting the yield to 2.132%. The dollar weakened against a basket of currencies, with the dollar index down by 0.1%.

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-- Written by Melinda Peer in New York.

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